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Suppose that I am holding a delicate china plate. For any plate that
drops from my hands, there is an extremely small objective chance that
a sudden gust of hot air will cushion its fall, preventing it from break-
ing. Consider the sequence of conditionals:
(1a) If I were to drop this plate, it might be saved by a sudden
gust of hot air.
(1b) If I were to drop this plate, it would break.
In light of the chance that the plate will be saved by a sudden gust of
hot air, what should we say about the truth conditions of the ordinary
conditional (1b)?
Some theories predict that (1b) is true. For instance, Lewis 1973b
says that the plate being saved by friendly air currents is a remarkable
low-probability event, and that worlds where such events happen are
farther away than worlds where I drop the plate and nothing special
happens. Hence the plate breaks in all the closest worlds where I drop
it, and so (1b) comes out true. Williams 2008 develops and defends a
neo-Lewisian account which similarly excludes wacky events from
worlds closest to ours. And Bennett 2003 develops a ‘‘near-miss’’ pro-
posal, according to which the plate may be saved by friendly air cur-
rents in some of the closest worlds where I drop it, but (1b)
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nevertheless counts as true because the plate breaks at a very high pro-
portion of the closest plate-dropping worlds.
Some theories predict that (1b) is not true. For instance, Ha´jek 2007
argues that (1a) is true and incompatible with (1b), and so he concludes
that (1b) is false. Gillies 2007 argues that conditionals like (1a) expand
the domain that subjunctives quantify over to include some possibilities
where the plate is saved by friendly air currents, so that (1b) fails to be
true in the resulting context.
I argue that both predictions are misguided. In particular, the above
theories are incompatible with justiﬁed intuitions about what credences
we ought to have in subjunctive conditionals.1 In §§1–2, I argue that the
theories fail to accommodate ordinary judgments about embedded sub-
junctives. In §§3–4, I examine our ordinary judgments in more detail.
Rather than endorsing armchair verdicts about the truth values of
subjunctives, ordinary speakers endorse constraints linking credences in
subjunctives with objective chances. I demonstrate that we can often
derive such constraints from justiﬁed premises. In §§5–6, I consider an
objection, namely that my argument supports a subjunctive analog of
Adams’ Thesis that is undermined by an analog of a familiar triviality
result for indicatives. In response, I outline the limits of the premises that
ground constraints on subjunctive credences. Belief in these premises is
justiﬁed in many ordinary contexts, but some premises fail to hold in the
context of the threatening triviality proof. Hence my derivation of con-
straints on subjunctive credences shows both why we are often justiﬁed
in accepting those constraints, and why the constraints are not threa-
tened by a subjunctive triviality result modeled after Lewis 1976.
1. Embedding Data for a Theory of Subjunctive Conditionals
In order to highlight the correct response to (1b), it helps to consider
our ordinary language judgments about another case involving wacky
events. Suppose I have a fair coin which I am not going to ﬂip one
million times. Consider the following sequence of conditionals:
(2a) If I were to ﬂip this coin one million times, it might land
tails at least once.
(2b) If I were to ﬂip this coin one million times, it would land
heads each time.
1 In what follows, ‘subjunctive conditional’ denotes those conditionals commonly
associated with updating by imaging rather than by conditionalization, i.e. ‘‘ontic
conditionals’’ in the terminology of Lindstro¨m & Rabinowicz 1995 and Rott 1999.
I use ‘subjunctive’ rather than ‘counterfactual’ since many of the relevant condition-
als are future subjunctives with true antecedents.
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The theories surveyed above assign the same truth value to (2b); they
agree that (2b) is false.2 In particular, each of the theories says that we
can know the truth value of (2b) without doing any coin ﬂipping, since
its truth value is determined by facts that we can know without doing
any coin ﬂipping: whether the coin landing heads each time is a
remarkable and improbable event, whether the coin lands heads each
time in a very small proportion of the closest worlds where it is ﬂipped
one million times, whether (2a) is true and incompatible with (2b), or
whether (2a) expands the domain that conditionals quantify over to
include some tails worlds. All of these facts are commonly taken to be
plainly determined in the case described above.
Here is the challenge for the theories in question: even though these
facts are plainly determined in the coin case, our ordinary judgments con-
tradict the verdict that (2b) is plainly false. Saying that (2b) is false fails
to predict the behavior of (2b) in embedded contexts. For instance, (3b)
sounds distinctly less felicitous than hedged assertions such as (3a):
(3a) I can’t say for sure what would happen if I were to ﬂip
this coin one million times.
(3b) #It’s not the case that this coin would land heads each time.
And (2b) does not embed in attitude ascriptions as if it were plainly
false:
(4) I wonder if this coin would land heads each time if I were
to ﬂip it one million times.
(5) I think it’s possible—though of course extremely unlike-
ly—that this coin would land heads each time if I were to
ﬂip it one million times.
(6) I doubt that this coin would land heads each time if I were
to ﬂip it one million times. But of course, you never know
for sure until you try.
Each of these judgments suggests that without doing any coin ﬂipping,
the semanticist can know that (2b) deserves very low credence, but not
that (2b) is actually false. In more detail: as we test semantic theories
2 Strictly speaking, Gillies 2007 argues only that (2b) is not true, cf. his oﬃcial
account on p. 351. The distinction between predicting that (2b) is false and predict-
ing that it is not true is not relevant for my argument, as neither prediction exhibits
appropriate semantic humility.
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against our intuitions, we take it for granted that we can tell which
events are improbable and atypical and quasi-miraculous. Suppose our
semantics says the truth of (2b) depends just on facts about how prob-
able or typical or quasi-miraculous it would be for a coin to land
hands one million times. Then as soon as we knew the semantics for
(2b), we would be able to tell whether (2b) was true. But intuitively, it
should not be so easy to tell whether (2b) is true. Quite the contrary: if
we do not actually ﬂip the coin one million times, then intuitively it
should be impossible to say how it would have landed if we had done
so. It is overreaching for our theory of conditionals to make a pro-
nouncement about how a fair coin would have landed in any number
of merely possible ﬂips, whether one or one million.
The case of the fragile plate is similar. Even if we are certain that
the plate being saved by friendly air currents would be a remarkable
and improbable event, we still cannot be certain that the plate would
break if dropped. Hence our theory of conditionals should not predict
that (1b) is true, but should instead accommodate the intuition that we
should simply give it very high credence:
(1b) If I were to drop this plate, it would break.
In other words, our theory of subjunctives should display semantic
humility, i.e., our semantic theory should deliver the truth conditions of
sentences without pronouncing on whether those conditions actually
obtain.
The case for semantic humility is even stronger in cases where the
objective chances relevant to our judgments are more conspicuous. For
instance, consider a coin biased 3:1 in favor of heads. (7a) sounds
much better than (7b):
(7a) Probably, the coin would land heads if I were to ﬂip it.
(7b) #It’s not the case that the coin would land heads if I were
to ﬂip it.
Our acceptance of (7a) is at odds with the overreaching verdict deliv-
ered by some theories of subjunctives, namely that the prejacent of
‘probably’ is plainly false.3 Intuitively, we should think that it is more
likely than not that the biased coin would land heads if I were to ﬂip
it, even in light of information that is alleged to plainly determine that
this conditional is false.
3 For instance, see p. 173 of Joyce 1999 and p. 331 of Lewis 1981.
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Judgments supporting semantic humility can help us decide between
otherwise similar theories of subjunctives. For example: in Moss 2010,
I defend a variably strict conditional semantics for subjunctives against
recent objections from advocates of dynamic semantic theories.4 In
particular, I argue that an independently motivated pragmatic theory
predicts the infelicity of reverse Sobel sequences, which was alleged to
be a challenge for the variably strict semantics. In addition, I oﬀer an
olive branch to the dynamic semanticists at the end of that paper,
acknowledging that they may predict a variety of intuitions about
reverse Sobel sequences if they supplement their semantic proposal with
a variant of the pragmatic theory I develop. The present paper whittles
away at that olive branch. A semantic theory of the infelicity of (1b) is
distinguished from a pragmatic theory in virtue of predicting that (1b)
fails to be true or that it generates some semantic inconsistency after
(1a). And these sorts of semantic verdicts are challenged by the case
for semantic humility that I present here.
In diagnosing theories that contradict our judgments about (1)–(7),
it is helpful to understand one common motivation for delivering
semantically immodest verdicts. For instance, consider the counterintui-
tive prediction that (8) is plainly true:
(8) If I were to ﬂip this coin one million times, it would land
heads at least once.
Predicting that (8) is true can seem like a forced alternative to giving a
widespread error theory. Here is a characteristic statement of this
reasoning from Williams 2010b:5
Quite generally it is plausible that any theory that makes [(8)] false,
will have a hard time avoiding making ordinary counterfactual
judgments false. The relevant facts seem so similar—the antecedents
counterfactually imply that the consequents are overwhelmingly
probable, but not that it is absolutely certain that they will occur. …
I shall assume, therefore, that if we are to avoid an error theory of
ordinary counterfactuals, counterfactuals such as [(8)] must also be
true. (12)
As we have seen, we should reject this argument for the truth of (8). In
particular, this argument presupposes that semanticists should decide
between theories that either ‘‘make (8) false’’ or ‘‘make (8) true.’’ The
embedding data we have considered suggest that neither is appropriate.
4 These objections are developed at length in von Fintel 2001 and Gillies 2007.
5 For further examples of similar reasoning, see §98 of Bennett 2003 and p. 396 of
Hawthorne 2005.
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On at least one reading, the truth of (8) intuitively depends on facts
that are not plainly accessible to the semanticist.
However, the reasoning in Williams 2010b does suggest a more seri-
ous worry that we must address. If our theory of conditionals does not
itself determine that (8) is true, then it may be inappropriate to say that
one knows that the coin would land heads at least once if it were
ﬂipped one million times. One might worry that for the same reason, it
will be inappropriate to self-ascribe knowledge of any ordinary sub-
junctive conditional. In other words, it may appear as if semantic
humility demands a uniﬁed treatment of knowledge ascriptions embed-
ding the following:
(1b) If I were to drop this plate, it would break.
(8) If I were to ﬂip this coin one million times, it would land
heads at least once.
After all, we cannot rule out that a dropped plate will be saved by
friendly air currents, just as we cannot rule out that a fair coin ﬂipped
one million times will land tails each time. So even if avoiding making
(8) true does not force us to give an error theory of ordinary subjunc-
tives, it may appear to force us to give an error theory of the knowl-
edge ascriptions that embed them. For similar reasons, it may appear
as if semantic humility demands that ordinary subjunctives should be
unassertable, for the same reason that some assertions of (8) are infelic-
itous, namely that they express an inappropriate conﬁdence that an
unlikely event simply would not obtain.
But in fact, semantic humility does not demand a uniform treatment
of (1b) and (8). Furthermore, what explains the contrast in the know-
ability or assertability of these two sentences has nothing to do with
their conditional nature. In aiming to predict that (1b) and (8) are
plainly true, the opponent of semantic humility mistakes an epistemic
problem for a semantic one. Suppose that you receive testimony that a
certain fragile plate was dropped yesterday. On that basis, you have a
justiﬁed high credence that the plate broke. (9) will generally be
felicitous for you to utter in most ordinary conversations about the
plate:
(9) That plate broke.
By contrast, suppose that you receive testimony that someone ﬂipped a
certain fair coin one million times yesterday. On that basis, you have a
justiﬁed high credence that the coin landed heads at least once. (10) will
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not generally be felicitous for you to utter in most ordinary conversa-
tions about the coin:
(10) That coin landed heads at least once.
(10) expresses conﬁdence that a certain unlikely event did not obtain.
And this expression of conﬁdence seems inappropriate. Given that the
contrast between (1b) and (8) is closely paralleled by the contrast
between (9) and (10), the former contrast begs for an explanation that
is not limited to conditional statements.
In fact, comparing (9) with (10) suggests a simple and natural explana-
tion of both contrasts, namely that (10) sets up a ‘‘lottery’’ context, while
(9) does not. In other words, (9) is like (11), while (10) is like (12):
(11) I will not be able to afford to go to Paris next summer.
(12) This lottery ticket is going to lose.
Furthermore, some general theories of the unassertability of lottery
statements may be easily extended to account for the contrast between
(9) and (10).6 For example: in typical contexts of utterance of (8), (10),
and (12), certain wacky possibilities are salient. These possibilities are
incompatible with the truth of the uttered sentence. According to general
principles defended in Moss 2010, this explains why utterances of (8),
(10), and (12) are typically infelicitous. By contrast, utterances of (1b),
(9), and (11) typically do not raise wacky possibilities to salience. Given
this theory of lottery statements, we may account for the unassertability
of (8) without endorsing the claim that ordinary subjunctives are unas-
sertable. And similarly, we may appeal to general theories of knowledge
ascriptions in ordinary contexts and lottery contexts to explain the con-
trast between knowledge ascriptions embedding (1b) and (8).
2. Alternative Accounts of Our Ordinary Language Judgments
Some opponents of semantic humility simply reject the foregoing sum-
mary of our ordinary language judgments. For example, Ha´jek 2007
sometimes suggests that embedding data are no problem for his theory,
because it is perfectly ﬁne to assert conditionals such as:
6 Some readers have reported that they hear (8), (10), and (12) as felicitous even in
lottery contexts. It is not important for my discussion that these sentences are heard
as infelicitous by all speakers, but rather that many speakers ﬁnd them less accept-
able than (1b), (9), and (11).
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(13) It’s not the case that if I had ﬂipped the coin, it WOULD
have landed heads.
So Ha´jek is not motivated to give a theory that predicts that negations
of ordinary subjunctive conditionals are unassertable.7
However, intuitions about (13) should not direct our general theory of
subjunctive conditionals. By capitalizing ‘would’ when giving examples
of unassertable conditionals, Ha´jek prompts interpretations of the condi-
tionals where ‘would’ is focused. But focusing constituents may change
the semantic values of conditionals, or suppress readings that would be
available in the absence of focus. By concentrating on readings of condi-
tionals made salient by focal stress, Ha´jek neglects other available read-
ings. If a speaker merely utters (13¢) without any focal stress, then there is
at least one reading on which the sentence is unassertable.
(13¢) It’s not the case that if I had ﬂipped the coin, it would
have landed heads.
In order to isolate this reading, it helps to think of (13¢) as answering a
question:
(14a) Would this coin have landed heads if it had been ﬂipped?
(14b) I don’t know what would have happened. / #No.
If it is common ground that the coin in question is fair, (13¢) sounds
bad in response to (14a). Insofar as (13¢) sounds okay on this reading,
it sounds as if the speaker is implicitly communicating that she knows
that neither side of the coin is marked heads. On this reading, far from
asserting or assuming (13¢), it is felicitous to ask someone to guess
whether the embedded subjunctive holds. (14b) highlights a shortcom-
ing of error theories of subjunctives, namely that they fail to predict
that on at least one reading, (13¢) is unassertable.
Another common response to arguments for semantic humility
about subjunctives is that sentences such as (5¢) and (7a) merely appear
to ascribe credence in a conditional:
(5¢) I think it’s extremely unlikely that the coin would land
heads each time if I were to ﬂip it one million times.
(7a) Probably, the coin would land heads if I were to ﬂip it.
7 See p. 84 of Hall & Ha´jek 1994 for further sympathetic comments.
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Here is a characteristic statement of this response from Bennett 2003:
Admittedly, we often ﬁnd it natural to say things like ‘There’s only a
small chance that if he had entered the lottery he would have won’,
and ‘It’s 50% likely that if he had tossed the coin it would have come
down heads’. In remarks like these, the speaker means something of
the form A > (P(C) ¼ n)—if the antecedent were true, the consequent
would have a certain probability; yet the sentence he utters means
something of the form P(A > C) ¼ n. … When we use one to mean
the other, we employ a usage that is idiomatic but not strictly correct.
(251)
This clever reinterpretation strategy accommodates our judgments
about (5¢) and (7a), but still fails to explain a range of ordinary judg-
ments about subjunctive conditionals. For instance, the unembedded
conditional (8) is plainly true on the near-miss proposal developed by
Bennett 2003:
(8) If I were to ﬂip this coin one million times, it would land
heads at least once.
The reinterpretation strategy under consideration does not explain why
(8) nevertheless sounds unacceptably hubristic in a variety of contexts.
Furthermore, it remains difﬁcult to explain why one cannot simply
answer (14a) in the negative:
(14a) Would this coin have landed heads if it had been ﬂipped?
(14b) I don’t know what would have happened. / #No.
The most natural extension of the reinterpretation strategy to (14b)
would be to claim that the negation in the infelicitous answer only
apparently takes wide scope over the conditional, so that the logical
form of that answer is as follows:
(15) #If it had been ﬂipped, this coin would have not landed
heads (i.e., it would have landed tails).
But it is implausible that the negation in the answer ‘No’ in (14b)
scopes under covert material made explicit in (15). Similar readings are
absent in structurally parallel cases. For instance, it is not possible to
read (16b) as expressing the proposition that exactly three people did
not read the newspaper:
SUBJUNCTIVE CREDENCES AND SEMANTIC HUMILITY 259
(16a) Did exactly three people read the newspaper?
(16b) No.
Hence it is not clear how Bennett’s reinterpretation strategy accounts
for our judgments about subjunctives embedded in questions.
In light of these difﬁculties for the reinterpretation strategy, one
might instead respond to my defense of semantic humility by saying
that accommodating ordinary language judgments about subjunctives
is supererogatory. Ha´jek 2007 endorses an error theory of subjunctive
conditionals, suggesting that it is not a signiﬁcant cost for his theory
to contradict systematic ordinary language judgments.8 Ha´jek does
concede one crucial point, though: even the error theorist must
explain the success of our practice of using subjunctive conditionals.
In response, Ha´jek claims that our utterances of conditionals such as
(1b) are legitimized by the existence of nearby conditionals such as
(17):
(1b) If I were to drop this plate, it would break.
(17) If I were to drop this plate, it would very probably break.
Ha´jek says that this is his best explanation of what vindicates our prac-
tice of uttering ordinary subjunctive conditionals.
But our ordinary judgments about (1b) do not in fact pattern with
our judgments about (17). For instance, if we are certain that the con-
ditional chance of the plate breaking if dropped is merely very high,
then intuitively we ought to be certain of (17) and less than certain of
(1b). In fact, as I argue in the following section, our expectation of the
chance of the plate breaking if dropped should match our credence in
(1b), while intuitively it should not match our credence in surrogate
conditionals like (17). Hence our judgments about ‘would’ conditionals
are not explained by the claim that speakers treat ‘would’ conditionals
as if they expressed the propositions literally expressed by their
‘would probably’ surrogates. The error theorist lacks an account of
our highly systematic ordinary language judgments about subjunctive
conditionals.
8 Of course, this strategy incurs costs common to all error theories. In discussing his
rejection of the conditional law of excluded middle, Lewis concedes that his seman-
tics does not respect the ‘‘oﬀhand opinion of any ordinary language speaker,’’ and
that ceteris paribus, one should aim to respect such judgments (Lewis 1973a, 80).
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3. An Argument Supporting Intuitive Constraints on Subjunctive Credences
The ordinary language judgments that conﬂict with extant theories of
subjunctives are not only pervasive, but highly systematic. Recall that if a
coin is biased 3:1 in favor of heads, (7a) sounds much better than (7b):
(7a) Probably, the coin would land heads if I were to ﬂip it.
(7b) #It’s not the case that the coin would land heads if I were
to ﬂip it.
(7a) suggests that our credence that the coin would land heads should
be determined by our opinions about the bias of the coin. If we are cer-
tain that the objective chance of the coin landing heads if ﬂipped is .75,
then intuitively we should have .75 credence that the coin would land
heads if it were ﬂipped. The same reasoning yields the intuitively cor-
rect credence in the other subjunctives mentioned in §1:
(1b) If I were to drop this plate, it would break.
(2b) If I were to ﬂip this coin one million times, it would land
heads each time.
(8) If I were to ﬂip this coin one million times, it would land
heads at least once.
Several facts about objective chances govern our assessment of these con-
ditionals. The objective chance of a fragile plate breaking if dropped is
extremely high. The objective chance of a fair coin landing heads one mil-
lion times if tossed one million times is 1
21;000;000
. And the objective chance
of a fair coin landing heads at least once if tossed one million times is
1 1
21;000;000
. On reﬂection, it is intuitive that our acceptance of these objec-
tive chance facts intuitively constrains our credence in (1b), (2b), and (8):
(1b¢) Our credence in (1b) should be extremely high.
(2b¢) Our credence in (2b) should be 1
21;000;000
.
(8¢) Our credence in (8) should be 1 1
21;000;000
.
(1b¢), (2b¢), and (8¢) are each instances of the following schematic principle:
(Bridge) A subject’s credence in ‘if it were going to be that A,
it would be that C’ should match her subjective expec-
tation of the current conditional objective chance that
C given that A.
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(Bridge) delivers the credence that we should have in each conditional
stated above, even in light of information that is alleged to plainly
determine its truth value.9
Furthermore, each of the above instances of (Bridge) is not only
intuitively correct, but also supported by a simple and compelling argu-
ment. Let ‘Ah! C’ be one of the above subjunctive conditionals, and
suppose you are a rational subject with a well-deﬁned credence in this
conditional. Let C be your current credence distribution, and let e(x) be
the expected value of x 2 [0,1] given these credences.10 Let ch be the
current objective chance function. The argument for each of the above
instances of (Bridge) proceeds as follows:
CðAh! CÞ ¼ eðchðAh! CÞÞ Superintendent Principle
¼ eðchðAh! CjAÞÞ expectation of (Independence)
¼ eðchðA ^ Ah! CjAÞÞ probability calculus
¼ eðchðA ^ CjAÞÞ expectation of Centering
¼ eðchðCjAÞÞ probability calculus
Two of the three substantive premises in this argument are familiar.
The Principal Principle says that your credences should reﬂect certain-
ties about objective chances: if you are certain of the objective chance
of P, your credence in P should equal your subjective expectation of
the objective chance of P. The ﬁrst premise of the above derivation is a
natural generalization of the Principal Principle defended by Lewis
1980 and van Fraassen 1980. Call it the Superintendent Principle: your
credence that P should always equal your subjective expectation of the
objective chance of P. Just as with the Principal Principle, the Superin-
tendent Principle must be restricted to cases where subjects lack inad-
missible evidence. But intuitively you do not have any inadmissible
evidence about how an ordinary coin would land if it were ﬂipped, or
whether an ordinary plate would break if it were dropped. Hence your
credence that the coin would land heads if ﬂipped should match
your expectation of the chance of it landing heads if ﬂipped. And
your credence that the plate would break if dropped should match your
expectation of the chance of it breaking if dropped. These instances of
9 Skyrms 1980 defends a similar principle connecting estimates of chance and the
‘‘basic assertability value’’ of a subjunctive conditional, and his principle entails
(Bridge) for subjects uncertain about which of several deterministic states obtains.
See Skyrms 1994, 1998 for further discussion. I use expressions such as ‘‘credences
in subjunctives’’ in order to avoid foreclosing on the possibility that subjunctive
conditionals do not express propositions; if subjunctives do express propositions,
‘‘credences in subjunctives’’ simply refers to credences in propositions expressed by
subjunctives.
10 In other words: eðxÞ ¼ R 1r¼ 0 r  Cðx ¼ rÞ.
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the Superintendent Principle are intuitively just as good as similar
instances of the Principal Principle, e.g., the claim that your credence
that the coin will be ﬂipped and land heads should equal your expecta-
tion of the chance that the coin will be ﬂipped and land heads.
The other familiar premise in the above derivation of (Bridge) is
roughly that you accept axioms for subjunctive conditionals that are
valid under standard centering assumptions. In the axiomatization for
VC given in Lewis 1973a, the relevant axioms are as follows:
(vc6) (/ hﬁ w)  (/w)
(vc7) ð/ ^ wÞ  ð/h! wÞ
The axiom (vc6) sufﬁces to establish that if A ^ Ah! C, then A ^ C.
The axiom (vc7) establishes the opposite direction.11 The centering axi-
oms are commonly accepted principles governing the logic of subjunc-
tive conditionals. For example, it is commonly accepted that ‘if you
were to ﬂip the coin, it would land heads’ is true in worlds where you
ﬂip the coin and it lands heads. And this is in accord with the ordinary
intuition that ﬂipping a coin and seeing how it lands is a good way to
see whether that coin would land heads if you ﬂipped it. Given the cen-
tering axioms, necessarily, A ^ Ah! C holds if and only if A ^ C
holds. Hence conditional chances concerning whether A ^ Ah! C
must equal conditional chances concerning whether A ^ C, and so your
rational expectation of such conditional chances will be equal.
The less familiar premise in the above argument concerns your
expectations about the nature of the objective chance function:
e(ch(A hﬁ C)) ¼ e(ch(A hﬁ C | A)). This premise holds whenever you
are certain that relative to the objective chance function, a subjunctive
conditional is probabilistically independent of its antecedent, i.e. that
the following principle holds:12
(Independence) ch(A hﬁ C) ¼ ch(A hﬁ C | A)
11 In the context of a variably strict semantics for subjunctives, (vc6) is valid if the
actual world is at least as close to itself as any other world, and (vc7) is valid if the
actual world is closer than any other. For further discussion of centering assump-
tions, see Lewis 1973a, p. 29ﬀ.
12 In more detail: when you are certain that ch(A hﬁ C) ¼ ch(A hﬁ C | A), we can
conclude:
eðchðAh!CÞÞ ¼
Z 1
r¼0
r  CðchðAh!CÞ ¼ rÞ ¼
Z 1
r¼0
r  CðchðAh!CjAÞ ¼ rÞ
¼ eðchðAh!CjAÞÞ
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For instance, dropping a plate normally makes no difference to the
objective chance that the plate would break if dropped. Similarly, ﬂip-
ping a coin normally makes no difference to the objective chance that
the coin would land heads if ﬂipped. It is difﬁcult even to construct a
realistic imaginative picture of a coin that would land heads if ﬂipped
just in case I ﬂip it, and would land tails if ﬂipped otherwise. In fact, in
most normal cases, a subjunctive and its antecedent are not only objec-
tively independent, i.e., independent relative to the current objective
chances, but evidentially independent, i.e. independent relative to your
current credences. For instance, when I ﬂip an ordinary coin, the infor-
mation that I ﬂip the coin intuitively does not give you any evidence
about how likely it is that the coin would land heads if I were to ﬂip it.
Though it is not directly relevant to the present argument, it is
worth noting that even in a large number of less normal cases where a
subjunctive is not evidentially independent of its antecedent, (Indepen-
dence) still holds. For example, consider the following simpliﬁed version
of a case from Kaufmann 2004.13 Urn A contains 49 red balls with
spots and one black ball. Urn B contains one red ball without spots
and 49 black balls. One of the two urns has been placed in front of
you. This urn was chosen according to the outcome of a fair coin toss:
Urn A is in front of you just in case the coin landed heads. Consider
the following conditional:
(18) If I were to draw a red ball, I would draw a ball with spots.
Intuitively, (18) is equivalent with the statement that Urn A rather than
Urn B is in front of you, which is equivalent with the statement that
the fair coin landed heads. So you should have .5 credence in (18). If
you were to learn just that you will draw a red ball, you could ratio-
nally take this as evidence that Urn A is in front of you, and raise your
credence in (18) accordingly. Hence (18) is not evidentially independent
of its antecedent.14 However, (Independence) still governs the objective
13 Kaufmann says that his case is a variation of a case suggested by Dorothy Edging-
ton in conversation.
14 Some have argued that cases similar to Kaufmann’s challenge Adams’ Thesis for
indicative conditionals, e.g. see McGee 2000 and Morton 2004. Rothschild 2010
notes that an indicative conditional will satisfy Adams’ Thesis if it is evidentially
independent from its antecedent, e.g. C(R hﬁ S) ¼ C(R hﬁ S | R). Rothschild
claims that in cases where evidential independence fails, it is intuitive to say that
Adams’ Thesis fails also. If this claim is correct, then one could respond to the ﬁrst
triviality result in Lewis 1976 by restricting Adams’ Thesis to cases where evidential
independence holds. The claim is contentious, though; emulating Gibbard 1981,
one might object that our intuitive rejection of Adams’ Thesis in such cases is
based on fallacious reasoning.
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chance of (18). Let R be the proposition that you draw a red ball, and
let S be the proposition that you draw a ball with spots. In the
Kaufmann case, there are two ways the world could be: either Urn A
is in front of you, or Urn B is. In the former case, we have
ch(R hﬁ S) ¼ ch(R hﬁ S | R) ¼ 1. In the latter case, ch(R hﬁ S) ¼
ch(R hﬁ S | R) ¼ 0. In either case, (Independence) holds.
Accordingly, (Bridge) also holds for your credences in the Kaufmann
case. The conditional chance of S given R is 1 just in case R hﬁ S.
The conditional chance of S given R is 0 just in case it is not the case
that R hﬁ S. Hence your expectation of the conditional chance of S
given R should match your expectation of the truth value of R hﬁ S,
just as (Bridge) dictates. In a similar fashion, (Bridge) holds in a num-
ber of cases where the antecedent of a conditional simultaneously gives
you information about what conditionals are true and what the objec-
tive conditional chances are.15
4. A Complication Concerning (BRIDGE)
(Independence) intuitively holds for many ordinary chance functions,
and the principle is useful in deriving instances of (Bridge). But there
is a caveat that complicates the present discussion: an exception to
(Independence) might arise when the antecedent of a subjunctive condi-
tional has no chance of occurring, as the conditional chance of its con-
sequent given its antecedent may then be undeﬁned. This exception
creates a problem for (Bridge): if a subject has some credence that the
antecedent of a future subjunctive A hﬁ C has chance 0, her expecta-
tion of the conditional chances ch(A hﬁ C | A) and ch(C | A) would
also then be undeﬁned. Williams 2010a notes that one could respond
to such potential counterexamples by positing primitive conditional
chances or by limiting the domain of (Bridge):
It’s perfectly consistent to take conditional chances to be well-deﬁned
even if the conditioned proposition is chance zero. […] And even if the
relevant conditional chances in some hard cases were in fact undeﬁned,
so that the conditional chance norm was inapplicable, that wouldn’t
mean that it was inaccurate within its domain of applicability. (8)
Even if one limits the domain of applicability of (Bridge), though, the
possibility of chance 0 antecedents still poses an underappreciated
challenge for the principle. The relevant challenge is that virtually no
15 For a more familiar case, consider the standard Newcomb problem (cf. Nozick
1969), where the fact that you will take one box is evidence that you would get rich
if you did, and also evidence that the conditional chance of your getting rich if you
take one box is 1 rather than 0.
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subject is certain that the antecedent of a subjunctive has some chance
of occurring, and that therefore the limited domain of application of
(Bridge) would be virtually empty.
A more complete response is needed. The advocate of (Bridge) has
several respectable options. First, as Williams notes, she may posit
primitive conditional chances. Second, she may say that (Bridge) gov-
erns your credences insofar as you approximate a subject who is certain
that whether A is true has not yet been settled. For instance, suppose
that for practical purposes, you should act as if you are certain that A
has some chance of occurring. Then for practical purposes, you should
act as if (Bridge) constrains your credences. Third, she may endorse a
variant of (Bridge) that merely bounds the credences of ordinary sub-
jects. For example, even if your expectation of the conditional chance
of C given A is not well-deﬁned, your credence in ‘A hﬁ C’ may still
be bounded by the credences of subjects who think the conditional
chance of C given A is some extreme value, i.e. either 0 or 1.
To spell out this last suggestion: suppose that you have credence a
that A has no chance of occurring, and that your remaining credence is
divided among various chance hypotheses in H. Then on reﬂection,
your credence may intuitively be constrained to satisfy the following
principle, which we may call (Bound):
X
Hi2H
CðHiÞ  eðchðCjAÞjHiÞ  CðAh! CÞ;
CðAh! CÞ 
X
Hi2H
CðHiÞ  eðchðCjAÞjHiÞ þ a ;
where e(x | P) is just the expected value of x 2 [0,1] given your credences
conditional on P.16 For example, suppose you have .05 credence that it
is already determined that you will not ﬂip a certain coin, and .95 cre-
dence that there is a chance you will ﬂip the coin and that it is .5 likely
to land heads if you do. Conditional on the latter chance hypothesis, the
expected conditional chance that the coin will land heads if ﬂipped is a
well-deﬁned value, namely .5. (Bound) entails that your credence that the
coin would land heads if ﬂipped should be near this value:
:95ð:5Þ þ :05ð0Þ ¼ :475  CðFh! HÞ  :525 ¼ :95ð:5Þ þ :05ð1Þ
In a similar manner, we may clarify our earlier discussion of Centering.
I said that the second familiar premise in the derivation of (Bridge) was
‘‘roughly’’ that you accept axioms (vc6) and (vc7). Strictly speaking,
16 In other words: eðx jPÞ ¼ R 1r¼ 0 r  Cðx ¼ r jPÞ.
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deriving (Bridge) requires that you accept these axioms with certainty.
In response, the meticulous theorist should endorse a qualiﬁed version
of (Bridge). She may say that (Bridge) governs your credences insofar
as you approximate a subject who is certain that Centering holds. Or
she may say that your credence in Centering determines the degree to
which your subjunctive credences are bounded by your expectations of
conditional chances.
This discussion highlights why principles like (Bridge) do not directly
yield substantive constraints on your credence in past subjunctives, if
corresponding primitive conditional chances are indeed not well-
deﬁned. The antecedent of a past subjunctive usually concerns some
past event that did or did not occur, and you are usually well aware of
this fact when you evaluate a past subjunctive. In fact, in many cases,
you may be conﬁdent that the antecedent of a past subjunctive did not
obtain. In this respect, you will not at all approximate a subject who is
certain that the antecedent of a subjunctive has some chance of occur-
ring. And (Bound) will not impose any substantial constraint on your
credences. As you evaluate the present subjunctive conditionals in §1,
by contrast, (Bound) does impose a substantial constraint on your cre-
dences.
As a side note, the fact that (Bound) does not directly constrain cre-
dences in past subjunctives does not mean that the principle has no
implications for your credence in such conditionals.17 In considering a
past subjunctive, it is important to remember that claims like (Indepen-
dence) and (Bridge) may have both held at an earlier time, constraining
your earlier credence in what you later express using the past subjunc-
tive. As long as you have not gotten information relevant to the truth
of the subjunctive in the meantime, your credence in that conditional
should match your earlier credence, and therefore match your earlier
expectation of the conditional chance of its consequent given its ante-
cedent. For example: suppose that just a moment ago, you decided not
to make a bet on the outcome of a fair coin toss. You have tossed the
coin but have not yet looked to see how it landed. Let us suppose that
your earlier utterance of (19) has the same truth conditions as your
later utterance of (20):
(19) If I were to bet on heads, I would win my bet.
(20) If I had bet on heads, I would have won my bet.
17 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for prompting me to clarify the import of
my discussion for credences in past subjunctives.
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(Bridge) says that before you failed to bet on heads, you should have
had .5 credence in (19). In the meantime, you have gotten no informa-
tion relevant to its truth. Hence you should later have .5 credence in
(20). On this proposal, (Bridge) yields constraints on credences about
past events in much the same way as the Principal Principle does. For
example: the Principal Principle says that before you ﬂip a fair coin,
you should have .5 credence that it will land heads. If you ﬂip the coin
and do not look at it, you get no information about how the coin
landed. Hence you should later have .5 credence in the claim that the
coin landed heads.
Of course, intuitively, you can usually get information relevant to
the truth of (20) after a coin is ﬂipped. Simply looking at the coin and
seeing that it landed heads may give you relevant information; indeed,
it may demonstrate that the past subjunctive is true. Slote 1978 and
Edgington 2003 claim that in this sort of case—originally due to Syd-
ney Morgenbesser—your later rational credence in a past subjunctive
comes apart from your earlier rational credence in the corresponding
future subjunctive. The present suggestion is that one can account for
this claim about the Morgenbesser case by saying that your later cre-
dence in the past subjunctive results from conditionalizing your earlier
credence in that subjunctive on the observed result of the actual coin
toss. By contrast, in a case where you bet on tails and a diﬀerent coin
would have been ﬂipped if you had bet on heads, learning the result of
the actual coin toss intuitively does not give you relevant information
about the truth of (20), and so (Bridge) may still inform your credence
in (20).
Let us survey where we stand. In evaluating the subjunctives men-
tioned in §1, it is reasonable to assume that the centering axioms are
valid and that the objective chance function satisﬁes (Independence).
But it may not be reasonable to endorse either of these assumptions
with certainty. Hence strictly speaking, our credences are constrained
by bounds determined by our credence in Centering and (Indepen-
dence), or they are constrained to the degree to which we approximate
subjects that are certain of these assumptions. In what follows, for
ease of exposition, I will adopt two assumptions: that subjects are in
fact certain that Centering holds, and that they are certain that
antecedents of subjunctives are not determinately false. I rely on the
reader to bear in mind that one may ultimately correct for these
assumptions in the manner just described. Having established this
caveat, we may conclude: the Superintendent Principle, an expectation
of (Independence), and an expectation of Centering are all justiﬁed pre-
mises concerning our subjunctive credences in (1b), (2b), and (8). As
we have demonstrated, it follows that instances of (Bridge) constrain
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our subjunctive credences in each case. The derivation in §3 thereby
conﬁrms the ordinary language judgments that challenge many extant
theories of subjunctives. Conditionals such as (8) do not call for an
error theory of subjunctive conditionals:
(8) If I were to ﬂip this coin one million times, it would land
heads at least once.
They call for a theory that accommodates our reluctance to say
whether conditionals like (8) are true or false. In particular, we should
prefer theories consistent with our systematic and justiﬁed acceptance
of (Bridge) as a constraint on our credences in the subjunctive condi-
tionals considered so far.
5. Subjunctive Triviality and the Limits of (BRIDGE)
The triviality results given by Lewis 1976 demonstrate that indicative
conditionals do not express propositions such that your credence in a
conditional proposition matches your conditional credence in the con-
sequent given the antecedent.18 One might worry that (Bridge) implic-
itly commits us to the dubious claim that subjunctive conditionals
cannot express propositions.19 Suppose that I am rational and that I
am certain of the objective chances. Let A and C be arbitrary proposi-
tions. By the Principal Principle, the objective chance that Ah!C
matches my credence that Ah!C. By (Bridge), that credence matches
the conditional chance of C given A. So the objective chance that
Ah!C matches the conditional chance of C given A. But for non-
trivial chance distributions, subjunctive conditionals cannot express
propositions such that the chance of each proposition matches the
conditional chance of the consequent given the antecedent. The trivial-
ity proof is just as for indicatives, but with chance distributions rather
than credence distributions as the relevant probability functions.20
With Edgington and Skyrms as notable exceptions, it is generally
accepted that subjunctives do express propositions. The potential objec-
tion to my argument is as follows: if that claim is correct and this argu-
ment is a reductio of (Bridge), then theories of conditionals should not
18 See Hall & Ha´jek 1994 for a helpful catalog of a variety of triviality results.
19 Edgington 1995 expresses the related worry that if we must take the same attitude
toward subjunctive conditionals as toward previously uttered indicatives, triviality
results about the latter demonstrate that the former attitude is not an attitude
toward a proposition.
20 This objection was ﬁrst brought to my attention by Bob Stalnaker in conversation.
Here I discuss the objection as developed by Robbie Williams in Williams 2010a.
SUBJUNCTIVE CREDENCES AND SEMANTIC HUMILITY 269
be faulted for yielding verdicts about ordinary subjunctives that are
inconsistent with (Bridge). For instance, in his discussion of a closely
related principle, Williams 2010a suggests that it is not reasonable to
expect theories to yield the verdicts entailed by claims like (Bridge),
since ‘‘it will be very hard to satisfy the Ramsey Bounds for any condi-
tional over a wide range of antecedents and consequents—so hard that
consensus opinion in the indicative debate is that the enterprise is
quixotic’’ (16).
However, the argument in §3 shows why we should be responsible
for accommodating the instances of (Bridge) highlighted by our
judgments in §1. (Bridge) is a general schema with many substitution
instances, and some of these instances are indeed justiﬁed. The §3 deri-
vation of (Bridge) depends on three substantive premises: the Superin-
tendent Principle, an expectation of (Independence), and an expectation
of Centering. As we evaluate the subjunctives discussed in §1, we are
justiﬁed in accepting each of these premises, and the instances of
(Bridge) that they entail.21 Conversely, as we will see, our rejection of
each of these three premises patterns with our rejection of (Bridge).
And the context of the triviality proof is just one of those contexts in
which (Bridge) and its grounding premises are not justiﬁed.
For starters, cases in which we reject the Superintendent Principle
are cases in which we should intuitively reject (Bridge) as well. For
example, as mentioned in §3, the Superintendent Principle fails in cases
where a subject has inadmissible information, in the sense of Lewis
1980. Intuitively, (Bridge) also fails in such cases. As Williams 2010a
acknowledges, if a trusted oracle tells you that a certain fair coin would
land heads if it were ﬂipped, you may raise your credence in that con-
ditional without changing your expectations of conditional objective
chances involving the coin. For instance, you may remain conﬁdent
that the coin is fair, so that your expectation of the conditional chance
of it landing heads if ﬂipped remains .5. In response to such examples,
Williams endorses a qualiﬁed version of (Bridge) that ranges only over
cases where subjects lack inadmissible information.
The Superintendent Principle may also fail for subjects who are
simply skeptical about whether there are any such things as objective
chances. Such subjects may not have any well-deﬁned expectations for
objective chances. Since the Superintendent Principle constrains
credences according to expectations for objective chances, it seems
inappropriate to apply the principle in cases where the latter values
are plainly undeﬁned. This restriction on the principle arises naturally
if we take the objective chance function to play the role of an expert
21 I am grateful to David Manley for helping me get clear on the dialectic here.
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in constraining your credences, as suggested in Gaifman 1988, van
Fraassen 1989, and Hall 1994. If someone does not think that there
are any experts on a certain subject, her credences should not be con-
strained by her estimates of current expert opinion on that subject.
Here again, (Bridge) intuitively fails along with the Superintendent
Principle. The skeptic about objective chance may have well-deﬁned
credences in subjunctives, though her expectations of conditional
objective chances are not well-deﬁned. Or more carefully, skepticism
about chances simply introduces another respect in which both the
Superintendent Principle and (Bridge) must be qualiﬁed: both con-
strain your credences only insofar as you give credence to the claim
that objective chances exist.22
Second, standard centering assumptions may be counterintuitive in
some cases, and such cases may count as additional exceptions to
(Bridge). For example, Lewis 1973a imagines his interlocutor protest-
ing that Centering intuitively fails for subjunctives with unrelated ante-
cedents and consequents, saying ‘‘what would we make of someone
who saw ﬁt … to assert that if the sky were blue then grass would be
green?’’ (28). Suppose that the interlocutor convinces you that ‘if the
sky were blue, then grass would be green’ is false. Suppose you are
certain that it is currently the case that the sky is blue and grass is
green. Then your expectation of the conditional objective chance that
grass is green if the sky is blue is 1. But you should not be certain of
the corresponding subjunctive. By rejecting Centering for this case,
you also thereby reject (Bridge). As in cases where subjects have inad-
missible evidence or have doubts about the existence of objective
chances, such failures of (Bridge) are easily understood and circum-
scribed.
Finally, it may be argued that (Independence) has exceptions. Here
is an example due to John Hawthorne in conversation: suppose that
it is unlikely that you perform a certain physical movement M
tomorrow, though in the unlikely event that you contract a rare dis-
ease D, the chance of your performing M is high. Suppose also that
the combination of contracting D and performing M causes death.
Then many judge that the objective chance of ‘if you were to
perform M tomorrow, you would die’ is low, but the conditional
22 This restriction need not severely limit the scope of (Bridge). For one thing, it
seems unlikely that many ordinary subjects would avow skepticism about the exis-
tence of objective chances. And if they did, they might still engage in enough ordin-
ary talk about chances so that on balance, charity would demand that we deny
their self-ascriptions of skepticism. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for
prompting me to discuss skepticism about chances and to clarify this point.
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objective chance of this subjunctive given that you perform M is
high. Insofar as (Independence) intuitively fails in this case, (Bridge)
fails as well. Since you are fairly certain that you do not have the
rare disease, your credence in ‘if you were to perform M, you would
die’ should be low. But since you are certain that your death is
objectively likely given that you perform M, your expectation of the
conditional objective chance of death given that you perform M
should be high.
In addition to this exception, one can imagine fanciful chance func-
tions that could in principle provide exceptions to (Independence) and
(Bridge). For instance, suppose that you are given a coin and told that
the following conditional has objective chance 23: that if you were to ﬂip
it, the coin would land tails. But the coin is extremely strange: its dis-
position to land tails is extreme if you ﬂip it, and eliminated if you do
not. In other words, the objective chances are as follows, where F is
the proposition that you ﬂip the coin and H is the proposition that it
lands heads:
chðF ^ Fh! HÞ ¼ 0
chðF ^ Fh! HÞ ¼ chðF ^ Fh! HÞ ¼ chðF ^ Fh! HÞ ¼ 1
3
If you are certain of these facts about the objective chances of F, H,
and F hﬁ H, then intuitively, (Bridge) should not constrain your
credence that F hﬁ H. It is perfectly compatible with your beliefs
that in fact it will turn out to be the case that F hﬁ H. Since you
are certain that the objective chance of that conditional is 13, you
should have 13 credence in the conditional. And since you are certain
about what the conditional objective chances are, the expected value
of those chances is also straightforwardly deﬁned. Since you are cer-
tain that it is objectively certain that the coin will not heads if
ﬂipped, the expected value of ch(H | F) should be 0 rather than 13.
6. Answering Subjunctive Triviality
Having discussed the limits of (Bridge), let us return to the subjunctive
triviality result outlined earlier. For simplicity, deﬁne conditional objec-
tive chance functions ch¢(x) ¼ ch(x | C) and ch¢¢(x) ¼ ch(x | C). Let C¢
and C¢¢ be rational credence distributions of hypothetical subjects that
are certain that ch¢ and ch¢¢ give the actual objective chances, respec-
tively. Here is a slight adaptation of the subjunctive triviality proof in
Williams 2010a:
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chðAh!CÞ
¼ chðAh!CjCÞchðCÞ þ chðAh!CjCÞchðCÞ probability theory
¼ ch0ðAh!CÞchðCÞ þ ch00ðAh!CÞchðCÞ probability theory
¼ C 0ðAh!CÞchðCÞ þ C 00ðAh!CÞchðCÞ (Principal Principle)
¼ ch0ðCjAÞchðCÞ þ ch00ðCjAÞchðCÞ (Bridge)
¼ 1  chðCÞ þ 0  chðCÞ probability theory
¼ chðCÞ calculation
(Bridge) is applied twice in the proof: once to replace C¢(A hﬁ C) with
ch¢(C | A) and once to replace C¢¢(A hﬁ C) with ch¢¢(C | A). But given
our more complete understanding of (Bridge), it is clear that these
instances of (Bridge) are not justiﬁed. In particular, (Independence) does
not always hold for the constructed chance functions ch¢ and ch¢¢, and
so expectations about these chances may not always constrain
hypothetical credences in ‘A hﬁ C’.
For example, let F be the proposition that you ﬂip an ordinary fair
coin, and let H be the proposition that the coin lands heads. Suppose
that there is a .5 objective chance that you will ﬂip the coin. The intui-
tive objective chances in this case are not hard to calculate:
chðF ^ Fh!HÞ ¼ 1
4
chðF ^ Fh!HÞ ¼ 1
4
chðF ^ Fh!HÞ ¼ 1
4
chðF ^ Fh!HÞ ¼ 1
4
(Independence) holds for this chance function. But consider the chance
function that results from conditionalizing the chances on the proposi-
tion that it is not the case that the coin will land heads. The resulting
objective chances are exactly those described in the ﬁnal exception to
(Independence) in the previous section:
chðF ^ Fh!HÞ ¼ 0
chðF ^ Fh!HÞ ¼ chðF ^ Fh!HÞ ¼ chðF ^ Fh!HÞ ¼ 1
3
In other words, according to the resulting objective chance function,
the coin’s disposition to land tails is extreme if you ﬂip the coin, and
eliminated if you do not. Whether the coin would land heads if ﬂipped
is not objectively independent of whether you ﬂip the coin. As we have
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seen, (Bridge) intuitively fails in such cases, and so it fails here, in the
context of the proof of the triviality result.
As we have seen, the class of chance functions for which (Indepen-
dence) holds is not closed under conditionalization. Hence (Bridge)
may constrain the credences of a subject certain that ch describes the
objective chances, while not constraining the credences of a subject cer-
tain that ch¢¢ describes the objective chances. The existence of such
exceptions to (Bridge) does not undermine the fact that instances of
(Bridge) hold in a wide range of ordinary cases. I should clarify the
dialectic here: ultimately it is does not matter for my argument that
any of the cases considered in §5 are genuine exceptions to (Bridge).
Rather, what matters is that the premises that ground our acceptance
of (Bridge) are reasonable in many ordinary cases. Hence theories of
subjunctive conditionals remain responsible for accommodating our
acceptance of justiﬁed instances of (Bridge). Semantically immodest
theories yield verdicts that are incompatible with justiﬁed instances of
(Bridge), and such verdicts are a signiﬁcant cost of such theories.
For all I have said so far, it might be that any viable theory of sub-
junctives necessarily yields verdicts incompatible even with justiﬁed
instances of (Bridge). It is beyond the scope of the present paper to
defend any particular theory of subjunctives consistent with justiﬁed
instances of (Bridge). But the §3 derivation may aid in the search for
such theories, namely by demonstrating that as long as a theory accom-
modates the premises that ground our acceptance of (Bridge), the the-
ory will accommodate our intuitions as well. And several recent
theories of subjunctives indeed meet these conditions. For instance, the
simplest strategy for accommodating justiﬁed instances of (Bridge) is
brieﬂy advocated in Hawthorne 2005: simply accepting the limit and
uniqueness assumptions and giving a closest-worlds semantics for sub-
junctive conditionals. In light of these assumptions, our opinions or
ignorance about a subjunctive conditional are simply opinions or igno-
rance about the character of the closest world where the antecedent is
true.
Other theories of subjunctives aim to account for (Bridge) without
positing metaphysically brute facts about similarity. For instance,
Schulz 2010 argues that ‘A hﬁ C’ is true if and only if C is true at an
arbitrarily selected relevant A world. Drawing on the radical semantics
of arbitrary reference in Magidor & Breckenridge 2011, Schulz
advances the theory that a particular arbitrarily selected world is
uniquely relevant to the truth value of a subjunctive, and that our prin-
cipled ignorance of which world is arbitrarily selected is responsible for
our uncertainty about the truth value of that subjunctive. A second
metaphysically conservative but semantically proﬂigate family of
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strategies makes use of the sort of constructions found in van Fraassen
1976. In particular, van Fraassen says that we can construct extended
chance functions over possible worlds supplemented with similarity
orderings, which we can then use to deﬁne truth values for subjunctives
at ordinary possible worlds. Williams 2010c gives a helpful catalog of
non-standard semantic theories that make use of such constructions.
For example: one might say that ‘if I were to ﬂip this coin, it would
land heads’ is .5 true, provided that the coin lands heads in the closest
world where I ﬂip it according to exactly half of the similarity orderings
supplementing the actual world.23 Theories in this spirit avoid strong
metaphysical assumptions, but they do give up on the project of giving a
standard truth-conditional semantics for subjunctive conditionals.
In light of these alternatives, it seems that the best argument for
rejecting justiﬁed instances of (Bridge) consists of the following pair of
claims: ﬁrst, that any theory that accommodates instances of (Bridge)
will necessarily be either metaphysically or semantically proﬂigate, and
second, that metaphysical and semantic conservatism are theoretically
more valuable than accommodating systematic and justiﬁed ordinary
language judgments. Neither claim may be taken for granted. For
instance, Swanson 2010 outlines a metaphysically and semantically
conservative theory that constitutes a challenge to the ﬁrst claim.
Williamson 1994 challenges conservative theories about what ingredi-
ents may participate in determining the truth conditions of ordinary
sentences; his arguments for epistemicism pave the way for semantically
proﬂigate theories that say that the context of utterance may contribute
a unique similarity ordering to the truth conditions of a subjunctive.
And van Fraassen 1974 suggests that one might justiﬁably accept meta-
physically proﬂigate theories of subjunctives on the grounds that they
‘‘add explanatory power vis-a`-vis the relevant language game’’ (189).
The upshot of this discussion is that a complete theory of subjunctives
must be not only a semantic theory, but a metaphilosophical theory as
well. The debate over the correct theory of subjunctive conditionals
cannot be settled by dismissing (Bridge) as unjustiﬁed or by explaining
away its instances with reinterpretation strategies. On the contrary, the
debate ultimately concerns the relative value of various virtues of ﬁrst-
order theories of subjunctive conditionals.
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